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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of governance and ownership variables on 
agency costs for a panel of large UK quoted companies. We use three 
measures of agency costs: the ratio of sales to total assets, the interaction of 
free cash flows and growth prospects and the number of acquisitions. We 
employ a range of techniques to analyse the data: fixed-effects, instrumental 
variables, and Tobit regressions. We find that the changes in board structures 
that have occurred in the post-Cadbury period have not, generally, affected 
agency costs. This suggests a range of mechanisms are consistent with firm 
value maximisation. We also find that having a nomination committee 
increases agency costs, which indicates that there are costs associated with 
certain governance mechanisms. Increasing board ownership also helps to 
reduce agency costs. We also find that debt reduces agency costs. Our 
results raise questions about the usefulness of the information sent to 
shareholders when firms adopt a recommended governance framework. 
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 Agency Costs, Corporate Governance Mechanisms and ownership structure 
in large UK Publicly Quoted Companies: a panel data analysis 
 
1. Introduction 
Agency costs arise from the misalignment of the interests of the owners and 
managers of firms when the separation of ownership and control occurs, 
Jensen (1986). The agency model identifies a number of governance 
mechanisms which realign the interests of agents and principals and so 
reduce agency costs. Recent changes in the UK, for example through the 
Cadbury and Hampel Committees, have stressed the importance of corporate 
governance mechanisms that take specific forms. In the UK, firms are 
expected to adopt board structures consistent with a Combined Code of Best 
Practice. 
 
In contrast Coles et al (2005), Coles et al (2007) and Boone et al (2007) 
argued that companies adopt a range of governance mechanisms, each of 
which is consistent with maximising firm value. They, therefore, question the 
usefulness of moving towards governance systems that identify preferred 
mechanisms. Such a system may force a firm to move away from a value 
maximising structure and to adopt a non-optimal structure. 
 
The paper makes a number of contributions to the agency costs debate. First, 
we present a UK analysis of the theory that firms choose value-maximising 
governance structures. There is evidence of that UK firms have increasingly 
adopted the Combined Code. Does this change therefore represent a move 
away from existing value-maximising governance mechanisms to another 
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combination of maximising mechanisms? Alternatively, does the adoption of 
recommended governance structures cause firms to end up with inappropriate 
governance structures?  
 
Second, the few studies that have attempted to directly measure agency costs 
have analysed the US context. Ang et al (2000) looked at small unquoted US 
companies and Singh and Davidson (2003) analysed quoted US companies. 
We undertake the first direct study of agency costs in large quoted UK 
companies.  
 
Third, we present the first UK study of agency costs that uses panel data, a 
technique which enables us to isolate both cross section and time series 
effects. Our analysis also explicitly differentiates between fixed and random 
effects models. In contrast, Singh and Davidson (2003) did not distinguish 
between these effects but merely reported results for both approaches. This is 
important because their results differ between fixed and random effects. 
Fourth, we investigate the endogeneity issue through the use of instrumental 
variables. Singh and Davidson (2003) do not address this issue. 
 
We find that there has been an increasing adoption of the key board structural 
recommendations of the Combined Code. In UK quoted companies, 
nomination committees are becoming more common, duality is rare, and 
becoming rarer. The percentage of non-executive directors has been 
increasing and now constitutes around 50% of boards.  
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Using a range of agency cost measures, we find that the changes to board 
governance mechanisms brought about by adopting the Combined Code’s 
recommendations have had little effect on agency costs. Consistent with 
Coles et al (2005) and Coles et al (2007) this suggests that UK firms have 
been able to move costlessly to new governance structures consistent with 
value-maximisation. However, we find that the nomination committee, and its 
structure, has had an unexpectedly negative impact on agency costs. This 
shows that setting up such a committee creates an ineffective mechanism and 
is not a component of the value maximising alternatives.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. The following section discusses the 
literature relating to agency costs and optimal board structures within the 
context of the UK Combined Code of Best Practice. It also discusses 
ownership and debt issues in relation to agency costs. Section 3 provides a 
discussion of the methodology and variable definition. Section 4 discusses the 
results of the study and in Section 5 some conclusions are drawn.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
This study provides a UK context for assessing the work of Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), Himmelberg (2002), Coles et al (2005), and Coles et al 
(2007). The traditional agency model identifies governance mechanisms that 
yield better governance relative to other less effective mechanisms. However, 
the above argue that there is a range of optimal governance structures each 
consistent with performance-maximising (agency cost minimising) outcomes 
and that performance and governance are endogenously determined.  
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The optimal structures model therefore assumes that the pre-Combined Code 
position represents a value-maximising outcome for UK firms. The adoption of 
the Code, with the move away from existing governance structures, will 
therefore enable firms to move to another value-maximising situation. 
Alternatively, they will incur costs as they adopt the non-optimal structures 
recommended by the Code. If this is the case, as McConnell (2002) argues, it 
may not be helpful to compel firms to adopt a prescribed set of board 
composition characteristics.  
 
The null hypothesis therefore is that firms incur trivial costs associated with 
changing governance structures in response to the Combined Code’s 
recommendations. In this case, the Combined Code neither harms nor 
benefits shareholders and so will not affect agency costs. Therefore no 
relationship is expected between the governance mechanisms and agency 
costs.  
 
The alternative hypotheses set out in the paper are consistent with a 
traditional agency perspective that the Combined Code recommends ‘good 
governance’ structures as predicted by the agency model. The implicit 
assumption here is that governance structures that are different from the 
recommended structures represent a non-optimal outcome. In other words, 
adopting the Code’s recommendations should reduce agency costs.  
 
A. Agency costs 
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We directly measure agency costs in three ways; first, using the assets-to-
sales ratio; second, by means of the interaction of free cash flow and growth 
prospects; and third, by means of the number of acquisitions undertaken by 
an individual firm. The assets-to-sales ratio has been used in two US studies 
as a direct measure of agency costs, Ang et al (2000) and Singh and 
Davidson (2003). Both studies argue that the ratio measures the efficiency 
with which management uses the firm’s assets to generate sales. A high ratio 
shows that assets are generating significant sales and therefore suggests low 
agency costs. In contrast, a low ratio suggests that management is 
implementing policies such as poor investment decisions or consuming 
excessive perquisites. A low ratio therefore indicates high agency costs and 
inefficient asset utilisation.  
 
This measure does, however, have a number of potential drawbacks. First, 
sales generation may not be synonymous with shareholder wealth because 
the sales may not actually come from profitable activities. Second, the sales 
may be generating cash flows that are being expropriated by the management 
and not being distributed to shareholders. Third, as Coles et al (2005) 
showed, productivity can vary even between firms within the same industry. 
Nevertheless, we argue, as Ang et al (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003), 
that the measure provides a useful indicator of agency costs.  
 
The second measure of agency costs is the interaction of free cash flow and 
growth prospects. Jensen (1986) proposed that agency costs are high when 
high free cash flows are combined with poor growth opportunities. Retaining 
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free cash flows reduces the ability of the capital market to monitor the 
decisions of management and hence large free cash flows suggest greater 
managerial discretion and higher agency costs. 
 
Opler and Titman (1993) argued that firms that have high growth prospects 
are more likely to be better managed. They are also less likely to have excess 
free cash flows because the available cash will be spent on positive net 
present value projects. Thus, as Doukas et al (2000) argued, agency costs 
may be regarded as a function of the interaction of growth opportunities and 
free cash flow. Firms that combine low growth prospects and high free cash 
flow can therefore be regarded as suffering from high agency costs.  
 
The third measure of agency costs is the number of firms acquired by a firm. 
Acquisitions are consistent with the managerial objectives such as power, 
Jensen (1986), and pay, Murphy (1985). Denis and McConnell (2003) argued 
that takeovers may therefore be undertaken to maximise managerial utility 
rather than to maximise shareholder wealth. Acquisitions are one way in 
which funds can be spent by managers rather than distributed to 
shareholders.  
 
There is a significant literature that shows acquisitions decrease, rather than 
increase, shareholder wealth, particularly from the perspective of the 
acquirer’s shareholders. For example, significant negative short run returns to 
acquirers have been found by Servaes (1991), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), 
Walker (2000) and Houston et al (2001). There is also evidence of negative 
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long run returns, for example, Agrawal et al (1992), Gregory (1997), Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) and Kohers and Kohers (2001). Accounting studies such 
as Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Dickerson et al (1997) and Sharma and 
Ho (2002) also show poorer post-acquisition performance. Finally, survey 
evidence such as Kelly et al (1999) found that 53% of acquisitions were 
believed to have destroyed value. Given the extensive evidence that indicates 
a lack of positive returns to acquiring firms’ shareholders, we argue that 
acquisitions can represent agency costs as directors use funds on negative 
net present value projects.  
 
B.  Board characteristics 
Board governance mechanisms have been the focus of a number of reports in 
the UK, the key ones being the Cadbury Report (1992), and the Hampel 
Report (1998). Out of these, and Greenbury (1996), came the Combined 
Code of Best Practice. In the UK, firms are expected to adopt board structures 
consistent with the Combined Code. As a condition of listing on the London 
Stock Exchange, companies must provide a statement in their annual reports 
about the ways in which they apply the principles expressed in the Code. This 
illustrates the ‘comply or explain’ approach of the UK. The Code identifies 
three key governance mechanisms, the percentage of non-executive 
directors, duality and the setting up of board subcommittees.  
 
There is a substantial literature that illustrates that boards should consist of a 
balance of executive and non-executive directors. This suggests that existing 
board structures represent an optimal outcome given the costs and benefits 
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associated with different types of director. Raheja (2005) argued that 
executive directors benefit the company because of the extent of their firm-
specific information. Numerous studies support the view that non-executive 
directors have a positive effect and find that boards dominated by non-
executive directors are more likely to act in shareholders’ best interests (for 
example, Weisbach 1988, Borokhovich et al 1996, Hermalin and Weisbach 
1988, Byrd and Hickman 1992, Brickley et al 1994). 
 
 In addition, Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Kaplan and Reishus 
(1990) showed that reputation concerns, fear of lawsuits and the market for 
their services motivate non-executive directors to be effective monitors of the 
board’s decisions. Brickley et al (1999) find evidence that boards take account 
of ability, based on previous performance, when appointing outside directors. 
Gilson (1990) reports that directors that resign following a firm’s bankruptcy 
achieve fewer directorships in the future than other directors. Coles and Hoi 
(2003) further support the importance of reputation by finding that non-
executive directors that limit managerial discretion, by means of rejecting anti-
takeover provisions, are rewarded by gaining additional directorships.  
 
The UK Combined Code of Best Practice recommended that non-executive 
directors should make up at least one third of the board. As a result there 
have been significant increases in the proportion of non-executive directors on 
UK boards since the Cadbury Report in 1992. For example, Dayha et al 
(2003) found that the percentage increased from 36.5% pre-Cadbury to 46% 
post-Cadbury. Therefore, the first hypothesis is:  
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H1: the greater the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, the 
lower the agency costs. 
 
The second specific governance mechanism identified in the UK Combined 
Code is duality. Consistent with Jensen (1993), the Combined Code regards 
duality as undesirable because it potentially gives one person too much power 
over the decision-making process. The incidence of duality has remained 
much higher in the US relative to the UK. Brickley et al (1997) reported that 
80.94% of their sample had the same person as CEO and chairman. Over the 
period, 1994-2000, Linck et al (2007) found the figure to be 58.3%. In 
contrast, in the UK the figure has dropped significantly from 54% in 1988, 
Conyon (1994), to 10% in 1996, (see table 1). 
 
Prior research examining the impact of duality on firm performance, however, 
has found little relationship between the two. For example, Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) and Weir et al (2002) reported that duality did not have a 
detrimental effect on the performance of UK firms, a finding supported by US 
studies (for example Baliga et al 1996, Brickley et al 1997 and Dalton et al 
1998). Consistent with the Combined Code’s recommendations, however, the 
second hypothesis is: 
H2: the separation of the posts of CEO and chairman should lead to lower 
agency costs. 
 
The third specific governance mechanism is the setting up of board 
subcommittees. The adoption of a formal nomination committee has been 
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much slower than other committees such as the audit and remuneration. Weir 
and Laing (2000) found that 95% of quoted UK companies had a 
remuneration committee in 1995 and Weir et al (2002) reported that 96% had 
an audit committee by 1996. In contrast, only 50% had a nomination 
committee in 1996 (see Table 1). Given that most of the firms had an audit 
and remuneration committee, we focus on the nomination committee.  
 
The nomination committee’s key function is to ensure that director 
appointments, whether executive or non-executive, are made on merit rather 
than by patronage. An effective nomination committee should therefore 
ensure the appointment of non-executive directors whose interests are 
aligned with those of the shareholders and so help reduce agency costs. 
Therefore the third hypothesis is: 
H3a: the presence of a nomination committee should reduce agency costs. 
 
The Combined Code also proposes that the nomination committee’s structure 
should have a majority of non-executive directors. An effective and efficient 
committee should therefore have a balance of executive and non-executive 
directors. The hypothesis therefore is:  
H3b: the presence of an executive director on the nomination committee will 
lead to lower agency costs 
 
In relation to CEO tenure, Jensen (1993) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) 
argued that the CEO is in a position to control the make-up of the board and 
hence reduce its monitoring capability. One way of addressing this is through 
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the length of time served as a CEO. As tenure increases, the CEO may 
become more entrenched, and more powerful, and less likely to pursue 
shareholder interests. The Combined Code recommends that all directors 
should be re-elected every three years. Thus: 
H4: the longer the CEO tenure, the higher the agency costs. 
 
The Combined Code stresses the importance of director quality which may be 
measured by his or her reputation within the business community. One 
indicator of reputation is the number of additional directorships held by the 
CEO. A CEO that runs a successful company will be highly regarded and in 
demand as a non-executive director for other firms. Thus sitting on additional 
boards is associated with promoting shareholders interests, and hence lower 
agency costs. Studies by Dowen (1995) and Klein (1998) found that the 
average number of additional directorships held by board members had a 
positive impact on firm performance. Therefore: 
H5: the higher the number of additional directorships held by the CEO, the 
lower the agency costs. 
 
C. Ownership characteristics 
Within the agency model, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that there is a 
convergence of interests between shareholders and managers as the 
manager’s ownership increases. Kren and Kerr (1997) show that board 
shareholdings provide an incentive to directors to act like owners in terms of 
the rigour of their monitoring efforts. Hence higher managerial ownership 
should reduce agency costs. Some support for the agency model comes from 
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Singh and Davidson (2003) who find weak evidence that higher managerial 
ownership reduces agency costs.  However, they only tested the linear 
relationship. 
 
A number of studies have found a non-linear relationship between internal 
ownership and performance which, under the agency model, indicates 
managerial entrenchment. For example, Morck et al (1988); McConnell and 
Servaes (1990); Dennis and Sarin (1999) in the US and Short and Keasey 
(1999) and Weir et al (2002) in the UK all find significant non-linear 
relationship between internal ownership and performance. The sixth 
hypothesis therefore consists of two parts, 6a, the agency expectation and 6b, 
the entrenchment prediction: 
H6a: agency costs will be lower the higher the managerial ownership. 
H6b: agency costs will be higher at both low and high levels of managerial 
ownership. 
 
Externally owned equity which is held principally by institutions provides an 
additional method of monitoring the actions of management. For example, 
Brickley et al (1988) show that institutional investors vote more actively on 
anti-takeover amendments than do other shareholders, and that they are 
more likely to oppose proposals that appear to be harmful to shareholders. 
Based on the efficient monitoring hypothesis, Pound (1988) argued that 
institutional investors have greater expertise and resources and can monitor 
management at lower costs than the average, less well informed, private 
shareholder.  
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Singh and Davidson (2003) found no evidence that outside block ownership 
affects agency costs, measured by asset utilisation, for US public companies. 
This is consistent with Doukas et al (2000) who argued that institutions may 
have neither the time nor expertise to act as effective monitors.  
 
In the UK, the Combined Code encourages institutions to enter into dialogue 
with companies and should be aware of any departure form the Code. The 
greater the ownership, the more involved institutions will become. Therefore: 
H7: agency costs will be lower at higher levels of institutional ownership 
 
We further test the incentive-monitoring aspects of the agency model by 
analysing the relative board and institutional shareholdings. By looking at the 
difference between institutional and board shareholdings we can gauge how 
far external monitoring may outweigh any potential entrenchment.  No sign is 
predicted because we do not know which effect is stronger. 
 
 D. Debt 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that debt is an important influence on 
agency costs. Firms with higher levels of debt are more closely monitored by 
debt-holders and thus managers have fewer opportunities to pursue non-
value maximising activities. In contrast McConnell and Servaes (1990) argued 
that an increase in the proportion of debt may result in increased investment 
in high-risk projects in an attempt to cover the interest payments. Therefore as 
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debt increases, there is a greater incentive for lenders to improve their 
monitoring and hence reduce agency costs. Thus: 
 H8: agency costs will be lower the higher the indebtedness of the firm 
  
Consistent with Singh and Davidson (2003), we control for firm size using firm 
sales. As Doukas et al (2000) showed, larger firms are more likely to have 
higher agency costs given their greater complexity and the greater 
informational difficulties faced by owners,  
 
3. Data, empirical design and variable measurement 
A. Data  
The sample consists of the UK non-financial firms incorporated in FTSE 350 
Share Index Companies. We use a panel dataset covering the period 1996 to 
2000 inclusive. The data therefore cover a period when both the Code and 
Combined Codes applied. The minimum number of years of data for each firm 
is 2 years with a maximum of 5. The mean is 4.2 years, generating an 
unbalanced panel dataset. Financial companies were excluded from the 
sample because they are subject to externally imposed scrutiny from 
organisations such as the Financial Services Authority. After adjustments, the 
dataset provided 534 firm observations from a total of 128 companies. Our 
data are taken from a number of sources. Company annual reports provided 
details for non-executive director representation and whether or not the posts 
of CEO and chairman were separated. They also provided information on the 
presence of a nomination committee and its composition. They were also 
used to gather data on CEO tenure and the number of additional directorships 
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held by the CEO. The reports also provided information on board ownership 
and institutional ownership. Acquisition data were taken from annual reports 
and Extel. Data on sales and debt were taken from DataStream.  
 
B. Empirical design 
A number of techniques are utilised to test our measures of agency costs and 
given that the data are in a panel, we must first determine whether the fixed-
effects or random effects model is appropriate. Wooldridge (2002) provides a 
clear discussion of the issues.  
(i) Assets-to-Sales 
The general fixed-effects model may be written 
ititiit uxy    
where i=1….N firms, t=1….T time periods with k regressors in itx  and itu  is a 
normal error term and yit is agency costs.  
 
The constant i  represents unobservable individual firm-specific effects 
which differ between firms and are time invariant. In a random effects model, 
however, the constant is a random outcome variable which has a cross 
section specific error component which is uncorrelated with the errors of the 
regressor variables. Thus 
ii    
and i has a zero conditional mean.  
The Hausman specification test enables us to differentiate between random 
and fixed effects models by testing for correlation between the x variables and 
 17
the individual random effects i . It is a test of strict exogeneity. If there is no 
correlation, random effects should be used but if correlation exists, fixed-
effects should be used,  
 
For example, in Model 1, table 3, the Hausman test gave a chi square of 
170.82 (p=0.000) so we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation and accept 
that the fixed-effects model is appropriate with the assets-to-sales agency 
cost measure. 
(ii) The Q-free cash flow interaction  
 As Doukas et al (2000), we construct a dummy variable whereby high growth 
firms are given the value zero and low growth firms the value one. High 
growth is defined as industry adjusted Tobin’s Q greater than the sample 
median. This is then multiplied by the actual free cash flow figure for each firm 
which enables us to identify low growth-high free cash flow firms. All firms that 
are not low growth-high free cash flow are censored at zero whereas agency 
costs for the low growth-high free cash flow firms is measured by their free 
cash flows.  An OLS would yield biased and inconsistent parameter estimates 
so a panel Tobit regression is used. 
(iii) The number of acquisitions 
This variable includes a non-trivial number of zero values because a number 
of firms did not make any acquisitions. Given that this is a count variable, that 
is it takes only non-negative integer values, we use the Poisson regression 
model.1  
 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Jeffery Wooldridge for this very helpful comment. 
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In Model 1, table 6, the Hausman test gives a chi square of 14.04 (p=0.17), 
hence the random effects model is used.  
 
(iv) Endogeneity 
Himmelberg (2002) argued that corporate governance is determined 
exogenously by environmental factors such as legal efficiency, regulation and 
the rules relating to the market for corporate control. In the UK, the crucial 
exogenous environmental factor is the Combined Code of Best Practice. As 
Coles et al (2007) argue, firm-level governance must therefore be treated as 
endogenous. If it is not, we are estimating a reduced form model rather than a 
structural one.  
 
There is a significant literature that recognises that models containing 
corporate governance or ownership variables suffer from endogeneity, for 
example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg et al (1999), Weir et al 
(2002) and Coles et al (2005). If present, ignoring endogeneity will yield 
inconsistent estimates. The particular form of endogeneity faced in 
governance and ownership models is simultaneity whereby agency costs and 
the right hand side variables may be simultaneously determined.  
 
One solution to the endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variables, 
Himmelberg et al (1999). We adopt the approach used by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg et al (1999), Coles et al (2007) and Linck et al 
(2007) and use the lagged values of the endogenous variables as 
instruments. In the analysis, all board structure, ownership and CEO 
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characteristics are treated as endogenous. An alternative possible solution to 
the endogeneity problem is the use of simultaneous equations. However, 
Coles et al (2007) report similar results when using simultaneous equations 
and instrumental variables, as do Hermalin and Weisbach (1991).  
 
The Hausman test gave a chi square of 80.45 (p=0.000), for model 1, table 4, 
suggesting we reject the null hypothesis of no correlation and therefore report 
the instrumental variables fixed effects model for sales-to-assets. 
 
C. Variable measurement  
i. Agency costs measures 
a) Sales to assets – is the natural log of one plus the industry adjusted ratio of 
sales-to-total assets. For each year we calculate the median of sales-to-
assets based on a two digit SIC code using all firms in the FTSE AllShare 
Index. We then subtract the industry adjusted figure from the company figure. 
Industry adjusted dependent variables have been used by Gompers et al 
(2003). Coles et al (2007) report stronger results when using the industry 
adjustment. 
b) Q*FCF - growth opportunities are measured by Tobin’s Q which is defined 
as market capitalisation plus total debt divided by total assets, McConnell and 
Servaes (1990). For each year we calculated the median Tobin’s-Q based on 
a two digit SIC code using all firms in the FTSE AllShare Index. The median 
was then subtracted to create an industry adjusted Q ratio. A Q dummy is 
constructed which takes the value of 1 if the firm’s industry adjusted Tobin’s-Q 
is less than the sample mean and zero if above the mean. Creating a dummy 
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variable for growth prospects is consistent with Doukas et al (2000). Free 
cash flows (FCF) are defined as operating income before depreciation minus 
the sum of taxes plus interest expense and dividends paid standardised by 
total assets, Lehn and Poulsen (1989). When multiplied, a high value for the 
interactive agency variable indicates higher agency costs.  
c) The number of acquisitions undertaken each year by a firm.  
ii. independent variables 
NOMCOM is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm has a formal 
nomination committee and zero otherwise. NOMXD is a binary variable that 
takes a value of 1 if an executive director sits on the committee and zero 
otherwise. DUALITY is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the posts of 
CEO and Chairman are undertaken by the same person and 0 otherwise. 
NXRATIO is the percentage of non-executive directors to total directors of the 
firm. BUSYCEO is defined as the number of boards a CEO serves on as a 
non-executive director. BOARDOWN is the proportion of ordinary shares 
owned by the board. INSTITOWN is the percentage of total ordinary shares 
held by institutions is in excess of three percent. Shareholdings below this 
level do not have to be disclosed in the UK. BOARDOWN2 is board 
shareholdings squared and controls for a possible non-linear relationship. 
RELOWN is defined as the institutional ownership minus board ownership. 
DEBT is the percentage of total debt to total assets. SIZE is the natural log of 
firm sales. 
 
 D. Empirical results 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the data. It was found that, over 
the period, the percentage of firms having a formal nomination committee 
increased from 47% to 85%. Of those firms with a nomination committee, the 
percentage that had an executive director sitting on it remained around 81% 
over the period. The incidence of duality fell from 10% to 6%. These figures 
therefore show that firms had been adopting the board structures as 
recommended by the Combined Code. We also find that firms were 
increasing the percentage of non-executive directors, from 45.2% to 50%, a 
figure higher than specified in the Combined Code. 
 
CEOs sat on an increasing number of boards over the period, rising from 0.73 
to 0.88. CEO tenure increased slightly during the period but fell back to an 
average of 5.97 years by 2000 compared to an average of 6.43 years in 1998. 
Board shareholdings increased from 3.6% to 4.9% whereas institutional 
ownership fell slightly from 25.4% to 24.8%. The difference between 
institutional and board ownership, RELOWN, fell from an average of 22.3% to 
19.3% indicating a slight increase in the ownership of boards relative to 
institutions. We also find that DEBT increased over the period as did SALES. 
Insert table 1 about here 
Table 2 reports the correlation matrix and is used to examine the relationship 
between all variables within the analysis. High collinearity exists between the 
NOMCOM and NOMXD (Pearson correlation = 0.72) and between RELOWN 
and institutional ownership (Pearson correlation = 0.84). These variables were 
therefore, included in separate regression models.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
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Table 3 presents the results for the sales-to-assets measure of agency costs. 
A positive coefficient indicates low agency costs and a negative one high 
agency costs. The presence of a nomination committee is found to be 
negative and statistically significant for all models. We also find that having an 
executive director sitting on the committee is associated with higher agency 
costs. Agency costs are also higher the longer a CEO holds office. There is 
also evidence that the greater the difference between board and institutional 
ownership, RELOWN, the lower the agency costs. All other board structure 
and ownership variables remain statistically insignificant. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
In Table 4 we address the issue of potential endogeneity by means of 
instrumental variables. The coefficient for the NOMCOM variable is negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level for all models. This finding runs 
counter to the argument put forward in the Combined Code which 
recommended that firms should establish sub-committees to ensure 
transparency within the process of appointing new directors. It also shows that 
committee adoption represents a move away from the frictionless transaction 
cost model and that significant costs are incurred. In economic terms, the 
committee coefficient of -0.23 translates into £159 million lower sales for the 
median firm that has a nomination committee relative to a firm not having a 
committee.  
 
As model 2 shows, committees that have an executive director as a member 
also experienced higher agency costs, rather than the hypothesised lower 
costs. The presence, and structure, of an audit committee therefore 
 23
represents a change of governance structure that is consistent with a move to 
a potentially non-optimal situation. It may be that the board as a whole is 
better equipped to deal with the director nomination process. The board’s 
overall experience, including the expertise of the executive directors, may be 
more able to identify better quality directors, given the other governance 
checks and balances.  
 
The UK’s framework regards duality as undesirable because it could give one 
person too much power over board decisions. The insignificant results 
reported in Table 4 suggest, however, that duality does not influence agency 
costs and is consistent with a relatively costless change in that governance 
mechanism.  
 
We also find no evidence that non-executive director representation affects 
agency costs with NXRATIO being positive but insignificant in both equations. 
Table 1 shows that the average, board comprised 48% non-executive 
directors. This figure is well in excess of the one third proposed in the 
Combined Code and suggests that the higher proportion of non-executive 
directors does not bring clear benefits to shareholders in the form of lower 
agency costs.  
 
In relation to our other measures of board effectiveness, we find that there is 
no association between the length of CEO tenure and agency costs. Thus the 
potential costs associated with longer serving CEOs is offset by the potential 
benefits gained by greater experience. The result is consistent with firms 
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choosing the tenure of their CEO according to how effective the CEO is 
perceived to be. This supports the Coles et al (2007) argument that firms 
choose their governance structures to maximise value and that this is 
achieved by means of a range of governance mechanisms. We also find no 
evidence that sitting on additional boards, BUSYCEO, is associated with 
higher agency costs. This suggests that CEOs are not spending too much 
time on outside activities and is also consistent with a value-maximising 
position. 
 
In terms of ownership, we find that higher board shareholdings are associated 
with lower agency costs.  No association is found for institutional ownership 
which is insignificant, as is relative ownership.  
 
Debt is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for all models 
suggesting that firms with more debt tend to have lower agency costs, which 
is consistent with Jensen (1986). As Singh and Davidson (2003), we find that 
the higher sales variable is associated with lower levels of agency costs. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
Table 5 presents the results for the Q dummy-free cash flow measure of 
agency costs. With this measure, a positive coefficient means high agency 
costs and a negative one implies low agency costs. The coefficient for 
nomination committee is positive and statistically significant for all Tobit 
regressions. NOMXD is also positive and significant. These findings are 
consistent with those presented in Tables 3 and 4 and indicate that firms are 
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being put under pressure to adopt non-value maximising structures so that 
they conform to the Combined Code.  
 
We also find that the percentage of non-executive directors on a company’s 
board and duality have no impact on agency costs. These findings are also 
consistent with the results reported in Tables 3 and 4. We also report that 
BUSYCEO and CEOTENURE are insignificant. These results suggest that 
any changes in these board-related mechanisms have been relatively 
costless in terms of transaction costs and that the new structures are 
consistent with value maximisation. 
 
We also find that higher board ownership reduces agency costs, but only at 
the 10% level. Given the insignificant quadratic term, there is no evidence of 
entrenchment which suggests that incentive effects appear to work as 
proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The INSTITOWN variable is 
positive and significant which suggests that at higher levels of institutional 
ownership, institutions become less effective in monitoring board actions. The 
finding that higher levels of institutional ownership may not mitigate the 
agency cost problem is consistent with Doukas et al (2000).   
 
The RELOWN variable provides a measure of the effectiveness of internal 
incentive effects as opposed to external monitoring. Its coefficient is positive 
and significant which indicates that the greater the extent to which institutional 
ownership exceeds board ownership, the poorer the monitoring and the 
higher the agency costs.  
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<Insert Table 5 about here> 
The results for our third measure of agency costs are reported in Table 6. 
Positive values indicate higher agency costs. We find that the nomination 
committee remains positive and significant and hence is associated with 
increases agency costs, as does the presence of an executive director on the 
committee. These findings are consistent with our other measures of agency 
costs. They show that firms appear to be moving away from company-specific 
value-maximising governance structures and adopting less effective 
structures. We also find that increasing the percentage of non-executive 
directors significantly reduces agency costs. This effect is not identified in our 
other measures of agency costs and may indicate that boards with significant 
non-executive director representation view acquisitions as a good thing. For 
example, they may be regarded as a means of reducing uncertainty or as a 
means of becoming more competitive. On the other hand, our results indicate 
ownership, DUALITY, BUSYCEO and CEOTENURE are not statistically 
significant.. Finally, we find that increased debt is associated with lower 
agency costs. 
Insert Table 6 
 
5. Conclusion remarks 
In this paper we analyse the relationship between agency costs and corporate 
governance characteristics within large UK quoted companies. Although, as 
Singh and Davidson (2003), we report that the results are sensitive to the 
definition of agency costs, we also find consistent results across the different 
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measures. Our modelling is therefore identifying key elements of the 
exogenous environment. 
 
In the UK, quoted firms are expected to ‘comply or explain’ their internal 
governance board structures against a Combined Code of Best Practice 
benchmark. Our data show that firms are moving towards compliance and 
hence the panel nature of the data can identify how this movement affects 
agency costs. The results therefore offer insights into the usefulness of a 
governance system that should result in firms having similar structures. 
 
Using a number of agency cost measures, we find that changes in board 
structural characteristics have little, or no, effect on agency costs in the UK. 
This shows that firms have moved to new structures that are consistent with 
value maximisation. This supports the theoretical framework proposed by 
Coles et al (2005), Coles et al (2007) and Boone et al (2006) that there is a 
range of board structures that are consistent with value-maximisation and that 
adopting the Combined Code has brought about little change in the 
effectiveness of governance structures. The process of ‘box-ticking’ has, 
generally, neither harmed nor benefited shareholders but has left them 
unaffected.  
 
This raises the issue about the extent to which firms should be allowed to 
determine their own preferred governance structures. For example, we find 
that one of the key governance mechanisms identified in the Combined Code, 
the setting up of a nomination committee, is associated with higher, rather 
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than lower, agency costs. Further, having a majority of the committee being 
non-executive directors is also associated with higher costs. It may be that 
this specific governance mechanism is, given the other mechanisms in place, 
more effective if undertaken by the whole board. The knowledge and 
expertise of the executive directors should be regarded as a positive rather 
than a negative. Given that UK firms have boards consisting of, on average, 
almost half non-executive directors, it will be harder for the executive directors 
to force through nominations unacceptable to the board as a whole. A 
committee that has a minority of executive directors will lose a significant 
element of expert knowledge.     
 
These findings show that the increasing adoption of recommended 
governance structures provides shareholders with potentially greater 
information asymmetry issues. Evidence of increasing compliance appears to 
be consistent with good governance but widespread adoption makes it more 
difficult to ascertain the impact of governance on agency costs. This may be 
because firms have adopted a ‘tick box’ approach to governance knowing that 
compliance will send a message to shareholders that accountability and 
transparency are being taken seriously. Thus shareholders of firms with the 
appropriate internal governance structures do not appear to benefit from lower 
agency costs.  
 
There is also some evidence that higher board ownership reduces agency 
costs which, consistent with Coles et al (2005), suggests that model does not 
account for all of the relevant exogenous factors affecting agency costs. A 
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similar conclusion may be drawn about debt given our finding that it reduces 
agency costs.  
 
The study identifies a number of areas for further study. First, the UK system 
makes it difficult for firms not to adopt the Code of Best Practice. Therefore a 
deeper understanding of the potential advantages of a less prescriptive 
system may provide important insights into the issue corporate governance. 
Second, the results are generally consistent with the theory that 
understanding the exogenous environment is crucial to interpreting the 
agency cost-governance relationship. However, the results also show that 
further work is required to develop our understanding of the environmental 
factors. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Descriptive statistics for selected board and ownership structure variables for the FTSE-350 companies over the period of 1996-2000. Data 
are collected from Annual Reports, DataStream and FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) and the net number of observations is 534. 
NOMCOM (Nomination Committee) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if such committee is formed and 0 otherwise. NOMXD is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a key executive director sits on the committee and 0 otherwise; and is the percentage of firms with 
key directors sitting on established nomination committees. Duality is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the posts of CEO and 
Chairman are undertaken by the same person and 0 otherwise. NXRATIO is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board of each 
firm. BUSYCEO is the number of boards the CEO serves as a non-executive director. CEO tenure is the number of years served as the CEO 
of the company. BOARDOWN (Board ownership) is the number of ordinary shares held by the CEO as a proportion from total ordinary 
shares of the company. INSTITOWN (Institutional Ownership) is the number of shares held by institutions as a proportion from total ordinary 
shares of the company. RELOWN is measured by the difference between institutional ownership and board ownership. Debt is the 
percentage of total debt to total assets. Sales is total sales.   
 
 
 
Variables 1996 
Mean 
(Median) 
1997 
Mean 
(Median) 
1998 
Mean 
(Median) 
1999 
Mean 
(Median) 
2000 
Mean 
(Median) 
NOMCOM 0.470 0.580 0.720 0.860 0.850 
 (0.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
NOMXD 0.809 0.810 0.764 0.826 0.824 
 (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) 
DUALITY 0.100 0.120 0.060 0.070 0.060 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NXRATIO 0.452 0.469 0.487 0.488 0.500 
 (0.440) (0.500) (0.470) (0.500) (0.500) 
BUSYCEO 0.730 0.740 0.740 0.780 0.880 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CEOTENURE 6.110 6.330 6.430 6.250 5.970 
 (4.000) (4.000) (4.000) (4.000) (4.000) 
BOARDOWN 0.036 0.041 0.040 0.050 0.049 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
INSTITOWN 0.254 0.253 0.261 0.252 0.248 
 (0.232) (0.242) (0.247) (0.228) (0.221) 
RELOWN 0.223 0.216 0.227 0.205 0.193 
 (0.221) (0.190) (0.210) (0.195) (0.180) 
DEBT 0.194 0.191 0.225 0.235 0.251 
 (0.184) (0.178) (0.231) (0.241) (0.260) 
SALES* 1,526 1,487 1,995 2,124 3,361 
 (582) (540) (1,015) (1,212) (1,454) 
 
*£000,000 omitted. 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Pearson Correlations Matrix  
.NOMCOM (Nomination Committee) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if such committee is formed and 0 otherwise. NOMXD is a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if a key executive director sits on the committee and 0 otherwise. Duality is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the posts of CEO and Chairman are undertaken by 
the same person and 0 otherwise. NXRATIO is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board of each firm. BUSYCEO is the number of boards the CEO serves as a 
non-executive director. CEO tenure is the number of years served as the CEO of the company. BOARDOWN (Board ownership) is the number of ordinary shares held by the 
Board as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. INSTITOWN (Institutional Ownership) is the number of shares held by institutions as a proportion from total 
ordinary shares of the company. RELOWN is measured by the difference between institutional ownership and board ownership. Debt is the percentage of total debt to total 
assets. LnSALES is the natural log of  firm total sales. 
 
Variables NOMCOM NOMXD Duality NXRATIO BUSYCEO CEO 
Tenure 
RELOWN 
 
Board 
Own 
Board 
Own2 
INSTITO
WN 
Debt LnSALES 
NOMCOM 1 
 
           
NOMXD 0.723** 
 
1           
DUALITY -0.086* 0.003 1          
NXRATIO 0.204** 
 
0.146** -0.101* 1 
 
        
BUSYCEO 0.214** 
 
0.209**  0.097* 0.102** 1        
CEOTENURE -0.167** 
 
-0.022 0.265** -0.086* -0.013 1 
 
      
RELOWN -0.089* 
 
-0.055  0.059 -0.130** -0.092* 0.041 1 
 
     
BOARDOWN -0.193** 
 
-0.093  0.165** -0.088** -0.206** 0.190** 0.473** 1 
 
    
BOARDOWN2 -0.129** 
 
-0.057  0.171** -0.063 -0.138** 0.120** 0.417** 0.921** 1 
 
   
INSTITOWN 0.002 
 
0.011 0.028 0.095* -0.020 0.062 -0.840** 0.060 0.074 1 
 
  
DEBT 0.009 0.001 0.016 0.168** 0.223** -0.022 -0.215** -0.175** -0.126** 0.137** 1 
 
 
LnSALES 0.020 
 
0.006 0.005 0.163** 0.233** -0.026 -0.190** -0.162** -0.111** 0.115** 0.270** 
 
1 
 
 
* - Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed), **- Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 3. Panel-Data Fixed-effects Regressions of Governance Mechanisms and Agency Costs – Sales to 
Assets 
 
The dependent variable is the industry adjusted natural log of sales to total assets (S/A), defined as the firms total sales scaled by the firms 
total assets. The predicted sign of the relation between dependent and independent variables are indicated in the third column. NOMCOM 
(Nomination Committee) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if such committee is formed and 0 otherwise. NOMXD is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a key executive director sits on the committee and 0 otherwise. Duality is a binary variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the posts of CEO and Chairman are undertaken by the same person and 0 otherwise. NXRATIO is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board of each firm. BUSYCEO is the number of boards the CEO serves as a non-executive director. CEO tenure is 
the number of years served as the CEO of the company. BOARDOWN (Board ownership) is the number of ordinary shares held by the Board 
as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. INSTITOWN (Institutional Ownership) is the number of shares held by institutions 
as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. RELOWN is measured by the difference between institutional ownership and 
board ownership. Debt is the percentage of total debt to total assets. LnSALES is the natural log of firm total sales. This model provides t-
statistics which are in parentheses.   
 
 
Variables 
AGENCY 
lnS/A 
Model 1 
AGENCY 
lnS/A 
Model 2 
AGENCY 
lnS/A 
Model 3 
AGENCY 
lnS/A 
Model 4 
Intercept -10.388*** 
(7.13) 
-10.518*** 
(7.28) 
-10.358*** 
(7.09) 
-10.507*** 
(7.24) 
NOMCOM -0.228*** 
(3.40) 
-0.227*** 
(3.41) 
__ __ 
NOMXD __ __ -0.217*** 
(2.88) 
-0.214*** 
(2.86) 
DUALITY -0.133 
(0.43) 
-0.129 
(0.79) 
-0.128 
(0.77) 
-0.124 
(0.75) 
NXRATIO 0.119 
(0.50) 
0.115 
(0.49) 
0.101 
(0.42) 
0.095 
(0.40) 
BUSYCEO -0.010 
(0.32) 
0.012 
(0.32) 
0.012 
(0.31) 
0.010 
(0.31) 
CEOTENURE -0.018*** 
(2.73) 
-0.018*** 
(2.68) 
-0.018*** 
(2.68) 
-0.017*** 
(2.62) 
BOARDOWN -1.282 
(1.10) 
__ -1.321 
(1.13) 
__ 
BOARDOWN2 1.469 
(0.67) 
__ 1.541 
(0.70) 
__ 
INSTITOWN 0.253 
(1.13) 
__ 0.222 
(0.99) 
__ 
RELOWN __ 0.361* 
(1.82) 
__ 0.338* 
(1.70) 
DEBT 3.627*** 
(3.99) 
3.581*** 
(3.95) 
3.673*** 
(4.02) 
3.625*** 
(3.99) 
LnSALES 0.487*** 
(6.08) 
0.491*** 
(6.16) 
0.484*** 
(6.03) 
0.489*** 
(6.11) 
Observations 534 534 534 534 
Groups@ 128 128 128 128 
R2 (Overall)  0.370 0.366 0.358 0.376 
 
*** - significant at .01 level, ** - significant at .05 level, *- significant at .1 level 
             Note: @ unbalanced panel.
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Table 4. Panel-Data Fixed-effects Instrumental Variable Regressions of Governance Mechanisms and 
Agency Costs – Sales to Assets  
  
The dependent variable is the industry adjusted natural log of sales to total assets (lnS/A), defined as the firms total sales scaled by the firms 
total assets. The predicted sign of the relation between dependent and independent variables are indicated in the third column. NOMCOM 
(Nomination Committee) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if such committee is formed and 0 otherwise. NOMXD is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if a key executive director sits on the committee and 0 otherwise. Duality is a binary variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the posts of CEO and Chairman are undertaken by the same person and 0 otherwise. NXRATIO is the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board of each firm. BUSYCEO is the number of boards the CEO serves as a non-executive director. CEO tenure is 
the number of years served as the CEO of the company. BOARDOWN (Board ownership) is the number of ordinary shares held by the Board 
as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. INSTITOWN (Institutional Ownership) is the number of shares held by institutions 
as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. RELOWN is measured by the difference between institutional ownership and 
board ownership. Debt is the percentage of total debt to total assets. LnSALES is the natural log of firm total sales. This model provides t-
statistics which are in parentheses.   
 
 
Variables 
AGENCY 
lnS/A 
Model 1 
AGENCY 
/nS/A 
Model 2 
AGENCY 
lnS/A 
Model 3 
AGENCY 
lnS/A 
Model 4 
Intercept -8.668*** 
(6.14) 
-8.985*** 
(6.40) 
-8.810*** 
(6.27) 
-9.150*** 
(6.55) 
NOMCOMiv -0.237*** 
(3.55) 
-0.241** 
(3.58) 
__ __ 
NOMXDiv __ __ -0.296*** 
(3.97) 
-0.304** 
(4.06) 
DUALITYiv -0.136 
(0.79) 
-0.060 
(0.35) 
-0.151 
(0.88) 
-0.081 
(0.48) 
NXRATIOiv 0.091 
(0.35) 
0.115 
(0.44) 
0.132 
(0.51) 
0.158 
(0.60) 
BUSYCEOiv 0.011 
(0.30) 
0.004 
(0.12) 
0.012 
(0.33) 
0.006 
(0.17) 
CEOTENUREiv -0.014 
(1.58) 
-0.012 
(1.38) 
-0.015* 
(1.67) 
-0.0213 
(1.49) 
BOARDOWNiv -1.876 
(1.61) 
__ -1.896 
(1.63) 
__ 
BOARDOWN2iv 4.964** 
(2.30) 
__ 4.931** 
(2.30) 
__ 
INSTITOWNiv 0.233 
(0.98) 
__ 0.172 
(0.73) 
__ 
RELOWNiv __ -0.040 
(0.19) 
__ 0.002 
(0.01) 
DEBT 4.582*** 
(5.09) 
4.388*** 
(4.89) 
4.482*** 
(5.01) 
4.276*** 
(4.79) 
LnSALES 0.389*** 
(5.00) 
0.407*** 
(5.24) 
0.398*** 
(5.13) 
0.417*** 
(5.38) 
Observations 408 408 408 408 
Groups@ 128 128 128 128 
R2 (Overall)  0.427 0.434 0.412 0.420 
 
iv = Instrumental Variables  
 
*** - significant at .01 level, ** - significant at .05 level, *- significant at .1 level 
 
 42
Table 5. Panel-Data Tobit Regressions Results of Governance Mechanisms and Agency Costs – Tobin’s-
Q and Free Cash Flows 
  
The dependent variable is QDummyxFCF, where the Q Dummy takes the value of 1 if the firm’s Tobin’s-Q (industry adjusted) is less than the 
sample median and zero otherwise. FCF represents Free Cash Flows which is based on Lehn and Poulsen’s model (Journal of Finance, 
1989), where FCF is scaled by market capitalisation. The predicted sign of the relation between dependent and independent variables are 
indicated in the third column. NOMCOM (Nomination Committee) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if such committee is formed and 
0 otherwise. NOMXD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a key executive director sits on the committee and 0 otherwise. Duality 
is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the posts of CEO and Chairman are undertaken by the same person and 0 otherwise. NXRATIO 
is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board of each firm. BUSYCEO is the number of boards the CEO serves as a non-
executive director. CEO tenure is the number of years served as the CEO of the company. BOARDOWN (Board ownership) is the number of 
ordinary shares held by the Board as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. INSTITOWN (Institutional Ownership) is the 
number of shares held by institutions as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. RELOWN is measured by the difference 
between institutional ownership and board ownership. Debt is the percentage of total debt to total assets. LnSALES is the natural log of firm 
total sales. This model is for censored outcomes of which z-statistics are in parentheses.    
 
 
Variables 
AGENCY 
QDummy 
Model 1 
AGENCY 
QDummy 
Model 2 
AGENCY 
QDummy 
Model 3 
AGENCY 
QDummy 
Model 4 
Intercept -0.504* 
(1.68) 
-0.482* 
(1.72) 
-0.559** 
(2.01) 
-0.543* 
(1.89) 
NOMCOM 0.028** 
(2.36) 
0.035*** 
(2.61) 
__ __ 
NOMXD __ __ 0.031** 
(2.43) 
0.033*** 
(2.61) 
DUALITY 0.006 
(0.28) 
0.022 
(0.99) 
0.008 
(0.69) 
0.016 
(0.51) 
NXRATIO -0.044 
(1.07) 
-0.015 
(0.37) 
-0.030 
(0.74) 
-0.019 
(0.39) 
BUSYCEO -0.007 
(0.80) 
-0.008 
(1.19) 
-0.007 
(0.86) 
-0.050 
(0.39) 
CEOTENURE -0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(0.66) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.001 
(0.84) 
BOARDOWN -0.353* 
(1.69) 
__ -0.254 
(1.22) 
__ 
BOARDOWN2 0.171 
(0.32) 
__ 0.034 
(0.06) 
__ 
INSTITOWN 0.077* 
(1.83) 
__ 0.070* 
(1.77) 
__ 
RELOWN __ 0.100*** 
(2.82) 
__ 0.096* 
(1.82) 
DEBT 0.125 
(0.70) 
0.188 
(1.00) 
0.107 
(0.61) 
0.140 
(0.73) 
LnSALES 0.023 
(1.43) 
0.020 
(1.27) 
0.026* 
(1.68) 
0.024 
(1.43) 
Observations 534 534 534 534 
Groups 128 128 128 128 
Wald Chi2 91.48 74.30 90.13 70.64 
Log-Likelihood 114.31 
 
112.12 
 
114.08 
 
112.11 
 
 
*** - significant at .01 level, ** - significant at .05 level, *- significant at .1 level 
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Table 6. Panel-Data Random Effects Model Poisson Regressions Results of Governance Mechanisms 
and Agency Costs – Bidder Acquisitions  
  
The dependent variable is the number of acquisitions undertaken by the bidding firm. The predicted sign of the relation between dependent 
and independent variables are indicated in the third column. NOMCOM (Nomination Committee) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if 
such committee is formed and 0 otherwise. NOMXD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a key executive director sits on the 
committee and 0 otherwise. Duality is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if the posts of CEO and Chairman are undertaken by the same 
person and 0 otherwise. NXRATIO is the percentage of non-executive directors on the board of each firm. BUSYCEO is the number of 
boards the CEO serves as a non-executive director. CEO tenure is the number of years served as the CEO of the company. BOARDOWN 
(Board ownership) is the number of ordinary shares held by the Board as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. 
INSTITOWN (Institutional Ownership) is the number of shares held by institutions as a proportion from total ordinary shares of the company. 
RELOWN is measured by the difference between institutional ownership and board ownership. Debt is the percentage of total debt to total 
assets. LnSALES is the natural log of firm total sales. z-statistics are in parentheses.    
 
 
Variables 
Bidder 
Acquisitions 
Model 1 
Bidder 
Acquisitions 
Model 2 
Bidder 
Acquisitions 
Model 3 
Bidder 
Acquisitions 
Model 4 
Intercept -5.962** 
(2.03) 
-5.837** 
(1.99) 
-6.001** 
(2.05) 
-5.883** 
(2.01) 
NOMCOM 0.529*** 
(3.80) 
0.520*** 
(3.77) 
__ __ 
NOMXD __ __ 0.466*** 
(3.45) 
0.467*** 
(3.47) 
DUALITY -0.184 
(0.62) 
-0.239 
(0.82) 
-0.231 
(0.78) 
-0.276 
(0.95) 
NXRATIO -1.212*** 
(3.10) 
-1.224*** 
(3.14) 
-1.180*** 
(3.02) 
-1.191*** 
(3.05) 
BUSYCEO 0.008 
(0.15) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.001 
(0.03) 
CEOTENURE 0.006 
(0.52) 
0.007 
(0.60) 
0.005 
(0.43) 
0.006 
(0.50) 
BOARDOWN 4.024 
(1.42) 
__ 3.465 
(1.25) 
__ 
BOARDOWN2 -10.242 
(1.38) 
__ -9.113 
(1.25) 
__ 
INSTITOWN -0.019 
(0.01) 
__ -0.038 
(0.09) 
__ 
RELOWN __ 0.060 
(0.16) 
__ 0.055 
(0.14) 
DEBT -2.936* 
(1.65) 
-2.939* 
(1.65) 
-3.067* 
(1.72) 
-3.032* 
(1.70) 
LnSALES 0.350** 
(2.16) 
0.349** 
(2.15) 
0.361** 
(2.23) 
0.357** 
(2.21) 
Observations 469 469 469 469 
Groups 115 115 115 115 
Wald Chi2 32.99*** 31.80*** 30.42*** 29.59 
Log-Likelihood -745.80 -746.96 -747.19 -748.13 
 
*** - significant at .01 level, ** - significant at .05 level, *- significant at .1 level 
 
 
